

**OPORD 03-FPB-116C**

Reference:

Tab A OPERATION PROMISED COMFORT MAP 1:50,000 Mapsheet

Tab B Rules of Engagement

Time Zone used throughout the Order: Local

**1. SITUATION**

**a. Enemy Forces**

**(1) General Situation and Threat:** The Republic of Chango is a resource rich but economically depressed country located in central Africa. Chango has undergone internal strife for the last 10 years due to the inability of the government to develop sufficient economic resources to satisfy the needs of the population. Chango has been experiencing ethnic strife as tribes blame one another for the problems faced by all. Roving bands of armed men that rob and murder are a constant threat to villages. More so, Chango has undergone a civil war since 1994 as a group of rebels known as the Army For Separatist Forces Central (AFSFC) seeks to come to power. The war between AFSFC and the Chango government has intensified the impact of basic problems such as an uncertain legal framework, corruption, raging inflation and the lack of openness in government economic policy and financial operations. Conflicting ethnic groups, the AFSFC and various government forces continue fighting and intelligence indicates that the United Nations has become a target for terrorist activity because of resolutions it has passed to curb the growing threat caused by international terrorism to the economic well being and democratic institutions of member nations. The economy of Chango is a mixture of village based agriculture and handicrafts, an industrial sector based largely on oil and mining, support services and a government characterized by budget problems and overstaffing. Oil has supplanted forestry as the mainstay of the economy, providing a major share of government revenues and exports. In the early 1980s, rapidly rising oil revenues enabled the government to finance large-scale development projects with GDP growth averaging 5% annually, one of the highest rates in Africa. Moreover, the government has mortgaged a substantial portion of its oil earnings, contributing to the government's shortage of revenues. The decline in oil prices and uncertainty of production due to ongoing terrorist attacks from AFSFC has hampered all efforts of the government to improve the economy and enhance the lives of the citizenry. Unemployment is high, even for the educated population and robbery and "irregular warfare" is being carried out throughout the nation. Irregular warfare is defined as warfare carried out by armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police or other internal security forces. Major causes of the conflict and persistent unrest include: ethnicity, overpopulation, resource scarcity, economic problems and governance. All these factors interact and reinforce each other simultaneously. On June 19<sup>th</sup>, about 20 employees of a US-owned oil company were taken hostage by heavily armed youths in the costal region of the country. The hostages were eventually released unharmed. Hostage taking is common in the oil-rich delta. Hostilities between the AFSFC and the government will likely escalate. UN

Security Forces are assigned to protect an unimproved airfield used for resupply humanitarian relief flights into Chango. The AFSFC considers UN support to be beneficial to the government of Chango and may choose to target the relief efforts despite its humanitarian mission. UN forces are currently in: Terrorist Threat: **HIGH**; Criminal Threat: **HIGH**; Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) Threat: **MED**, Terrorist Force Protection Condition (FPCON): **BRAVO**; and MOPP Level: **0**. Conditions are subject to immediate change based upon the threat in the local area. Additionally, MOPP 0 requirements are in place for patrols going out into the local area due to a number of dead bodies which are lying throughout the countryside and the current AIDS epidemic throughout Africa. Chango has a very poor medical system and disease is rampant. All dead bodies or wounded personnel captured should be treated as a biohazard.

**(2) Weather/Light Data and General Forecast:** Heavy rains will cause flooding in low lying areas which can impede or prevent vehicular and foot traffic for short periods of time. Effect on Troops: Due to the humidity and daytime hot temperatures, ensure your troops consume plenty of water. The temperatures can drop drastically at night and, if raining, it may become very cold. Be prepared. Ensure all troops check on each other for possible weather-related injuries.

**(3) Terrain:** The terrain surrounding the radar site is grass, scrub oak and live oak trees, interspersed with numerous hills, rising up to 200 meters. The ground is vegetated and provides good concealment. There are numerous roads and trails not listed on your map. The region contains several wadis in excess of 10' deep and can support both wheeled and tracked vehicles.

**(4) Identification of enemy forces:** AFSFC rebels possess a supply of stolen battle dress uniforms (BDUs) which maybe worn in any fashion or not at all. Other armed groups possess no distinctive uniforms and may or may not wear any type of camouflage clothing.

**(5) Location, known and suspected:** The AFSFC rebels are dispersed throughout the country. The largest rebel populations are reported to be in the South. Small rebel bands are known to be operating in the vicinity of the airfield and throughout numerous unpopulated areas to the Southeast. Rebel bands normally operate in teams of 6 or less, are well equipped (suspected to possess sophisticated, short range, IR-guided surface to air missiles-SA-16), and are reported to be conducting reconnoiter and disruption missions. Hit-and-run disruption tactics have been principally aimed at small government military communications sites, roadblocks, checkpoints and convoys.

**(6) Activity:** Chango government intelligence reports that AFSFC teams have been observed performing reconnoiter operations from hilltops overlooking several key military and industrial sites. Two separate reports include AFSFC teams occupying key terrain surrounding the UN radar site for short periods of time. Foreign news services reports AFSFC forces are conducting re-supply operations and coordinating efforts to mount larger scale attacks against military and political targets. Several AFSFC teams are reported to be training and rehearsing assassin tactics and MOUT operations. No significant progress to end hostilities has been made to date. Both sides are determined to win at all costs.

**(7) Strength, Morale and Capabilities/Equipment:** Overall, the AFSFC rebel strength is estimated to be 8,000. Less than 20% of this number is actually involved in hostile action, while the remaining provide intelligence, provisions and shelter. AFSFC rebels usually operate in small teams (6 or less) but are training to operate in squad-sized units (9-13) and flight sized

units (50+) to better conduct coordinated, larger scale operations. Their morale is estimated to be HIGH as they experience continued success in defeating small groups of Chango government soldiers in remote locations. They are equipped and trained with standard US-made automatic weapons, such as the M-16 rifles and M-60 machine gun. Although they possess limited heavy machine guns and mortars AFSFC forces are currently not trained in their use. In addition, some patrols conducting small-scale operations have been observed using first generation night vision devices. Intel sources reveal AFSFC rebels have stolen an unspecified number of SA-16 missiles. A Notice to Airman Message (NOTAM) on potential SAM threat has been issued to all military and civilian aerial ports in Chango. To date, rebel forces have not employed SAMs against either civilian or military aircraft. In addition, AFSFC rebels have managed to capture a limited number of military vehicles (HMMWVs, and 2.5 ton trucks).

**(8) Probable Course of Action: Most Likely COA:** AFSFC rebel forces will continue to conduct small-scale attacks against smaller government outposts and facilities while training their forces to conduct larger scale coordinated attacks. The AFSFC may attempt to recruit Chango military members to help train their forces and possibly lead future large-scale attacks. Unless UN diplomatic representatives can exert influence to resolve this civil war and assist in the economic recovery of the Republic of Chango, hostilities will escalate and many more casualties on both sides are anticipated. The threats issued by the AFSFC against foreign countries conducting military or assistance operations in Chango warrant extreme caution.

**b. Friendly Forces:**

**(1) Mission of Next Higher Unit:** TF Durango conducts air base defense operations in support of OPERATION PROMISED COMFORT to ensure continued humanitarian relief operation. The Commander's intent is to mitigate risk to relief operations by identifying the threat and prevent attack; engage only when absolutely necessary; limit civilian casualties and collateral damage in civilian areas; Endstate: mission success is maintaining stability and security with limited or no friendly casualties.

**(2) Location of Adjacent Units:**

**(a)** Elements of the Royal Highland Fusiliers and Royal Canadian Air Force are responsible for protecting all relief convoys from the airfield to the main operating base, Life Support Area (LSA) Krulak, and food distribution and security for humanitarian relief workers at remote sites. In addition, they will conduct security patrols of Main Supply Routes (MSR) during times of increased threats. They are wearing Disruptive Pattern Uniforms (DPUs) and are carrying British SA-80s (individual weapons) and LSWs (Light Support Weapons).

**(b)** A FLT, 5 AEF SFS provides perimeter security for the LSA Krulak. They are restricted to conducting defense operations within the confines of the LSA perimeter fence.

**(c)** B FLT (+), 5 AEF SFS is conducting internal security on the unimproved airfield to include base entry points located on the perimeter and a UN communication relay site.

**(d)** Multinational UN Security Force personnel are interspersed with 3rd Platoon, Royal Highland Fusiliers and Royal Canadian Air Force personnel. They are also conducting limited security at numerous villages throughout the country.

**(3) Units providing Fire Support:** None

**c. Attachments and Detachments:** None

**2. MISSION:** 4 AEF SFS deploys in support of TF Durango NLT 0001L11OCT03 to conduct response force operations to deter, detect, deny, delay, mitigate and neutralize AFSFC efforts to interfere with relief operations.

### **3. EXECUTION**

**a. Commander's Intent:** A FLT will assist the 5 AEF SFC in providing security for Chango Airfield, UN communication sites and designated humanitarian convoy routes. Endstate is denial of interruption to relief operation efforts will without loss of friendly personnel or sensitive equipment.

**b. Concept of the Operation:** This will be a four-phase operation.

**(1) Phase I (Pre-Departure Activities).** This phase begins with receipt of this order. All training, mission rehearsals and pre-departure inspections and checks will be done during this time. This phase ends when transportation arrives at individual unit departure locations. Success is defined as 100% personnel trained, equipped and organized for battle.

**(2) Phase II (Movement to the AO).** This phase begins when transportation departs home stations and ends at the arrival at the mission staging point (Lackland AFB). This phase ends when all personnel are trained, organized and equipped for battle.

**(3) Phase III (Staging).** This phase begins with the "Team Captains Meeting" where final coordinating instructions will be given to the unit. This phase ends when units are transported to the designated start points.

**(4) Phase IV (Execution).** This phase begins when units arrive at their designated start points (SP) and receive further guidance by the means of Fragmentary Order (FRAGO). This phase ends upon change of mission or until notified by higher headquarters.

**c. Scheme of Maneuver:** Upon arrival at the mission staging base (Lackland AFB) units will be briefed by mission control officers and be given a time table and further instructions for mission execution.

**d. Tasks to Subunits:**

**(1)** A FLT, 4 AEF SFS provides on order mobile response throughout the area of operation.

**(2)** B FLT, 4 AEF SFS provides close security for aircraft parking on Chango Airfield.

**e. Coordinating Instructions:** Participating units will be task organized and equipped in accordance with the DC03 Brochure.

**(1) UN Installation Entry Prerequisites and Procedures:**

(a) UN Security Force personnel identity will be verified against military ID card. If unable to positively identify individual(s) after checking military ID, use sign-countersign to verify status of individual(s) and contact headquarters. During the hours of darkness or inclement weather, or in THREATCON Charlie or Delta, installation entry controllers will verbally challenge vehicle drivers with sign-countersign before approaching vehicle(s) to identify occupants. With the exception of convoy operations deemed critical and approved by the UN deployed force commander, all humanitarian relief convoy operations will be suspended during THREATCON Charlie and Delta.

(b) UN Humanitarian Relief agency personnel identification will be verified against an ID card, with photo, issued by their assigned organization. Civilian Humanitarian Relief personnel will be pre-announced prior to arrival to installation entry points.

(c) The TF Durango commander must approve all visits by host nation military forces to Chango Airfield. Host nation military forces and National Police visitors will be pre-announced prior to arrival at the installation entry control point and remain under continuous escort until departure from the area. Escort ratio is one (1) escort for every five (5) visitors. All host nation military and National Police vehicles will be thoroughly searched prior to allowing entry. All host nation military, National Police and civilian contractor visits to the installation will be suspended during THREATCON Charlie or Delta.

(d) Host nation civilian contractor personnel entry procedures are the same as para c above, host nation military forces and National Police entry procedures. (EXCEPTION: Civilian contractors are authorized entry to the installation during daylight hours only).

(e) Local national civilian personnel are not allowed entry to Chango Airfield.

## **(2) MSR Checkpoint Prerequisites and Procedures:**

(a) MSR checkpoints are manned by Chango National Police (CNP) with communications links to both the National Police Headquarters and the Task Force headquarters. Personnel assigned to these posts are bi-lingual and are chosen for their proficiency with the English language. A minimum of three (3) CNP personnel are normally assigned to MSR checkpoints. During declared national emergencies, up to six (6) CNP may be posted at MSR checkpoints.

(b) During daylight hours, all host nation and UN Security Force personnel will be challenged with verbal sign-countersign at MSR checkpoints. Identification of UN and host nation military forces will be verified against military ID card issued from their respective country. During the hours of darkness vehicles approaching MSR checkpoints will stop no closer than twenty (20) meters from the checkpoint. CNP manning the checkpoint will challenge vehicle with color-of-the-day (controlled and issued by CNP HQ for UN and CNP personnel only) by means of flashlight. Vehicle operators will return appropriate color-of-the-day response by flashlight, proceed up to and stop at the checkpoint. Positive visual ID will always be conducted prior to allowing access through all MSR checkpoints. All UN military personnel may vouch for contents and security of the vehicles they are operating. All vehicles operated by other than positively identified personnel will be searched.

(c) UN Humanitarian Relief agency personnel will travel only under UN military convoy escort. Proof of identification will be carried on their person at all times. This credential may be checked at MSR checkpoints to verify civilian UN personnel's identity.

(d) All local national civilian personnel and vehicles are thoroughly searched. During national emergencies or THREATCONs Charlie or Delta, all civilian vehicle traffic approaching the Airfield will be stopped, denied access.

**(3) Order of Movement, Formation, and Movement Techniques:** per SOP.

**(4) MOPP Level:** MOPP 0.

**(5) Actions on Enemy Contact:** Per ROE and squad SOPs.

**(6) Equipment Issue:** At the designated time, you will be directed to link-up with the Sadler Cup S-4 for equipment, weapons, and ammunition issue. You will have the opportunity to check weapons and equipment, and zero your MILES if you desire.

**(7) Debriefing:** A representative from the squadron S-2 shop will conduct a debriefing upon completion of your mission. **NOTE: All maps, OPORDs and overlays must be returned to the S-2 upon completion of this mission. They may not be reproduced at any time without the permission of the S-2.**

**(8) Priority Intelligence Requirements:**

(a) Any movement of suspicious personnel or hostile forces.

(b) Number and type of weapons.

(c) Written and oral reports will follow the Size, Activity, Location, Uniform, Time, and Equipment (SALUTE) format.

(d) Any documents taken off wounded or killed hostile forces.

**(9) Rules of Engagement (ROE):** All forces assigned to TF Durango are bound by the auspices of United Nations Resolution (UNR) 3129. The ROEs for this mission are in Tab B of this Order. The ROEs are in effect and will remain so until further notice to ensure compliance with UNR 3129. Your tactical actions must be consistent with the ROEs at all times.

#### **4. SERVICE SUPPORT**

##### **a. General:**

(1) Logistical Resupply Point (LRP) will be Bldg 6168, LSA Krulak.

(2) Casualty collection point will be Bldg 6169, LSA Krulak.

(3) EPW collection points will be Bldg 1016, LSA Krulak.

##### **b. Materials and Services:**



**(1) Supply:**

**(a) Class V:** Ammunition amounts are IAW the DC03 Brochure. Blank ammunition will be issued once you arrive at the S-4 area. ONLY BLANK AMMUNITION WILL BE EMPLOYED DURING THIS EVENT. Take all directions from the S-4.

**(b) Class VII: Major End Items:** MILES equipment, GPS, blank ammo, and weapons will be issued under the direction of the S-4. Mandatory equipment required for this operation is in the DC03 Brochure.

**(2) Transportation:** Vehicle transport of personnel will be done by 2 1/2 ton trucks and HMMWVs. TF Durango personnel will be assigned driving responsibility when 2 1/2 ton trucks transport is required. All personnel will be licensed to operate a HMMWV .

**(3) Services:** None.

**(4) Maintenance (Weapons and Equipment):** Necessary field expedient maintenance will be performed as required. Combat Arms personnel are available if assistance is needed.

**c. Medical Evacuation and Method of Handling Dead and Wounded:**

**(1) KIA:**

**(a)** Friendly priority is as follows:

1. Airlift out if possible.
2. Retain within sector if airlift is not possible and if it will not compromise your mission.

**(b)** Indigenous dead will be reported and left in place.

**(2) WIA:**

**(a)** Friendly priority is as follows:

1. We will attempt to MEDEVAC if possible.
2. If not, send back the wounded to the casualty collection point. Walking wounded will be sent back with one man. Litter patients will be sent back with a litter team.

**(b)** Indigenous wounded will be treated if time and situation permits.

**d. Personnel:** (Method of Handling EPWs/detainees) If you take prisoners, immediately notify CDOC and comply with instructions. POWs will be treated IAW the Hague and Geneva conventions. **Note:** The top left pocket is a “safe” pocket for the enemy, EPWs and detainees.

**e. Miscellaneous:**

**(1) Captured Equipment:** Do not remove or take any of the enemy's weapons, ammo, or equipment. Just make note of what was found and pass this information on during the debrief.

**(2) Uniform and Equipment:** IAW with DC03 Brochure.

**(3)** The declination for 1:50,000 topographical maps is 8 degrees (grid to magnetic, subtract).

## **5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL**

### **a. Command:**

**(1) Location of Higher Unit Commander and CP:** The Squadron Commander will be located in the BDOC, Bldg 6200, LSA Krulak.

**(2) Location of the Flight Commander and Flight Sergeant:** They will be located within their assigned areas of responsibilities.

**(3) Succession of Command:** Flight Commander, Flight Sergeant, 1st Squad Leader, 2nd Squad Leader, and 3rd Squad Leader.

### **b. Signal:**

**(1) Method of communication in priority:** secure radio, Land Line (if available), hand and arm signals, sign-countersign, flashlight, and verbal.

**(2) Signal Operating Instructions:** TBA